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Fix a cardinal κ . We can ask the question: what kind of a logic L is needed to characterize
all models of cardinality κ (in a ﬁnite vocabulary) up to isomorphism by their L-theories?
In other words: for which logics L it is true that if any models A and B of cardinality κ
satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic?
It is always possible to characterize models of cardinality κ by their Lκ+,κ+ -theories, but
we are interested in ﬁnding a “small” logic L, i.e., the sentences of L are hereditarily
of smaller cardinality than κ . For any cardinal κ it is independent of ZFC whether any
such small deﬁnable logic L exists. If it exists it can be second order logic for κ = ω
and fourth order logic or certain inﬁnitary second order logic L2κ,ω for uncountable κ . All
models of cardinality κ can always be characterized by their theories in a small logic with
generalized quantiﬁers, but the logic may be not deﬁnable in the language of set theory.
Our work continues and extends the work of Ajtai [Miklos Ajtai, Isomorphism and higher
order equivalence, Ann. Math. Logic 16 (1979) 181–203].
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We shall investigate whether second order equivalence of two models, or equivalence in some stronger logic than second
order logic, implies isomorphism of the models in certain cardinalities. We always assume that our vocabulary is ﬁnite. The
notation which is not yet explained can be found under the heading “Notation” below.
Remark 1.1. We are assuming throughout this paper that the vocabulary is ﬁnite. This is because if the vocabulary is ﬁnite,
then the isomorphism type of the model is characterizable inside the model in second order logic. In inﬁnitary second order
logic L2κ,ω the isomorphism type of the model is characterizable if the vocabulary is smaller than κ , and our assumption is
stronger than what is needed.
The following lemma of Shelah demonstrates that not all countable models with countable vocabularies can be charac-
terized by their second order theories.
Lemma 1.2 (Shelah). There are two countable non-isomorphic second order equivalent models in a countably inﬁnite vocabulary. The
models are also Ln-equivalent for any n.
Proof. The vocabulary of the models contains inﬁnitely many constants {cn: n ∈ω}. Let A be a model such that dom(A) =
{an: n ∈ω} and cAn = an for each n. Let dom(B) = {an: n ∈ω} ∪ {aω} and cBn = an for each n.
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element aω is not an interpretation of any constant. We claim that the models A and B are Ln-equivalent for any n. So take
an arbitrary Ln-sentence φ. Let τ be the ﬁnite set of constants in φ. Now A  τ is isomorphic to B  τ and it follows that A
and B satisfy the same Ln-sentences in the vocabulary τ . Thus A | φ ⇔B | φ. 
Suppose L is a logic [3] (Chapter 2, Deﬁnition 1.1.1). The L-theory of a model is the set of L-sentences true in the model.
Two models are said to satisfy the same L-theory if they satisfy the same L-sentences.
Deﬁnition 1.3. We use the expression A(L, κ) to refer to the following condition: For any models A and B of cardinality κ ,
if A and B satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic.
We use A(Z F , κ) to denote the condition “for all models A and B of cardinality κ in a ﬁnite vocabulary, if A and B
satisfy the same sentences (with the model as a parameter) in the language of set theory then A∼=B.” Note that ZF is not
a logic as two isomorphic models can satisfy different sentences in the language of set theory.
Deﬁnition 1.4. We call A(L2,ω) when restricted to ordinals the Fraïssé Hypothesis. This is the Hypothesis: All countable
ordinals have different second order theories.
Ajtai [2] has proved that A(L2,ω) is independent of ZFC. We are looking for related results in the cardinality ℵ0 and
similar results in higher cardinalities. The name “Fraïssé Hypothesis” has been introduced by Wiktor Marek. The Fraïssé
Hypothesis has been studied by Fraïssé [4] and Marek [12,13].
Our results are relative to the consistency of ZFC. If we assume more than the consistency of ZFC it is always explicitly
mentioned.
In Section 3 we will recall the proof of Ajtai and make some observations related to A(L2,ω).
In Section 4 we will develop a forcing technique for coding subsets of ordinals by collapsing certain cardinals. This
forcing is used to prove for example the following: If κ is a cardinal in L, then there is a transitive model of ZFC in which
A(L4, λ) holds for exactly cardinals λ smaller than or equal to κ .
In Section 5 we will show that if κ is a cardinal, then there is a language Lκ∗ with κ many generalized quantiﬁers
such that A(Lκ∗, κ) holds. Given a cardinal κ the language Lκ∗ may be different for different models of ZFC containing κ
and it is also possible that no such Lκ∗ is deﬁnable in the language of set theory. This result for κ = ω is due to Scott
Weinstein (Personal communication with Jouko Väänänen) and the generalization for uncountable κ is based on an idea of
Per Lindström (Personal letter to Jouko Väänänen, 1 August 1974).
In Section 6 we will use Ajtai’s method to prove that it is independent of ZFC whether A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds for a regular
cardinal κ . We will also prove that for different regular cardinals κ and λ, A(L2κ,ω, κ) and A(L
2
λ,ω,λ) are independent of
each other. We will also give an analogous result for singular cardinals.
In Section 7 we will investigate the relation between A(L2,ω) and various large cardinal axioms. If there are inﬁnitely
many Woodin cardinals and a measurable cardinal above them, then A(L2,ω) fails. Assuming the consistency of relevant
large cardinal axioms, if n is a natural number, then there is a model of ZFC in which there are n Woodin cardinals and
A(L2,ω) holds. As n grows bigger, more complex second order sentences seem to be needed to characterize all countable
models up to isomorphism. A(L3,ω) is consistent with Martin’s Maximum and practically all large cardinal axioms.
For a discussion of the role of second order characterizations in the foundations of mathematics see [21].
Notation
The expression ZF-formulas refers to formulas in the language of set theory, i.e., ﬁrst order language in a vocabulary with
one binary relation ∈. ZF-equivalence of two structures, denoted by A≡Z F B, refers to the condition that A and B satisfy
the same formulas of the language of set theory, i.e., for any formula φ(x) in the language of set theory V | φ(A) ↔ φ(B).
If L is a logic A ≡L B refers to the condition that A and B satisfy the same sentences of L. The expression H(κ) refers
to the set of sets hereditarily smaller than κ , i.e., {X : the transitive closure of X has cardinality less than κ}. The symbol
 means “restricted to”. Depending on context this can mean a reduct of a model to a smaller vocabulary or restriction
of some operations to some set. The notation φM(·) refers to the set of tuples which satisfy the formula φ in model M.
A forcing name of a given set X is denoted by X˙ . Interpretation of a deﬁnable set in a given model of ZFC is denoted by
the set with the model of ZFC as superscript: for example ωL1 means the ω1 of L. If t is a term, A is a model and s is an
assignment which maps the free variables of t to elements of A, tAs refers to the interpretation of t in A with assignment s.
Analogously if R is a higher order variable RAs refers to the interpretation of the higher order variable R in the model A
with assignment s. If the higher order variable has subscripts and superscripts, we use parentheses for clarity: for example
(Rij)
A
s . The expression A |s φ refers to the condition that the formula φ with the assignment s is satisﬁed in the model A.
By the reals we mean the power set of ω.
Notation which is not explained is standard as used for example in Jech’s book [9].
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2.1. The logics Ln
In this section we will present some fundamental deﬁnitions and lemmas about higher order logics. This section does
not contain any new results. In the rest of the paper we have indicated results from the literature when we use such. All
the other results are, according to our knowledge, new.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An n-ary relation Rni ⊆ (dom(A))n is deﬁnable in a language L in a model A if there is an L-formula
φ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
Rni =
{
(a1, . . . ,an): A | φ(a1, . . . ,an)
}
.
An isomorphism-closed class of structures C is characterizable in a logic L if there is an L-formula φC (X1, . . . , Xm) such
that for any model A, A |s φC (X1, . . . , Xm) iff (A, (X1)As , . . . , (Xm)As ) ∈ C . When C is a singleton class {B} we say that the
model B is characterizable in L.
A model B= (B, R1, . . . , Rn) is deﬁnable up to isomorphism in model A in a logic L if there is an L-formula φB such that
the following hold:
• A |s φB(X1, . . . , Xm) iff ((X1)As , . . . , (Xm)As ) is isomorphic to B,• there is an assignment s such that A |s φB(X1, . . . , Xm).
We use L2 to refer to second order logic. In L2 we can quantify over all ﬁnitary relations over the universe of the model,
thus our second order logic means the second order logic with full semantics. There are also other second order logics
which do not use full semantics such as monadic second order logic where we can quantify over unary relations only, and
second order logic with Henkin semantics [7]. More generally Ln refers to nth order logic with full semantics.1
Deﬁnition 2.2. We say that a second order formula φ(X, Y ) deﬁnes a well-order of the reals if in the model (N,+, ·,0,1)
the formula φ deﬁnes a well-order of the subsets of N.
We say that a second order formula φ(X, Y ) deﬁnes a well-order of the power set of κ if in the model (κ,∈) the formula
φ deﬁnes a well-order of the subsets of κ .
Let τ = {R1, . . . , Rn} be a relational vocabulary and let the arity of Ri be ki for each i. We will next introduce a way to
code a model of inﬁnite cardinality κ in vocabulary τ into a subset of κm , where m =∑1in ki .
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Coding a model into a subset of κm). Let B= (B, RB1 , . . . , RBn ) be a model of cardinality κ in the vocabulary τ
and let < be a well-order of B in order-type κ . We don’t expect < to be deﬁnable in B. Later in the proof of Theorem 3.1
we will in a way build (or guess) < by second order quantiﬁers, which is possible as the structure (κ,<) is deﬁnable up to
isomorphism by an L2-formula in a model of cardinality κ . The relations of B can be coded into an m-ary relation Xmn ⊆ Bm
in the following way: any sequence of ordinals belongs to Xmn iff for some i it is of the form
( 0,0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
j<i k j times
α1 + 1,α2 + 1, . . . ,αni + 1, 0,0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
i< jn k j times
)
for some ordinals α1, . . . ,αni such that B | Ri(α1, . . . ,αni ). The ordinals αi , αi + 1 etc. refer to elements of B which have
order-type αi , αi + 1, etc. with respect to <.
Lemma 2.4. Let A = (A, RA1 , . . . , RAn ) be a model of inﬁnite cardinality κ in a ﬁnite vocabulary τ . Let #Ri = ki for each i and
m =∑1in ki . Then:
• A is isomorphic to some models2 which have κ as universe.
• The set IA of those subsets of κm which are codes of models isomorphic toA is deﬁnable up to isomorphism inA by an L2-formula.
Proof. Obviously any bijection from A to κ generates a model isomorphic to A which has κ as universe.
1 There are several ways to deﬁne Ln . By and large they are all equivalent (at least as long as they allow to prove Lemma 2.5).
2 We think models here as set theoretic objects. Thus there are many models isomorphic to A with κ as universe, though up to isomorphism there is
only one.
L. Keskinen / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (2013) 230–250 233Recall that we assume, as in Deﬁnition 2.3, that < is a well-order of A in order-type κ . In (A,<) the relation Xmn
(introduced in Deﬁnition 2.3) is L2-deﬁnable and each relation RAi is second order deﬁnable from X
m
n . Let ψ(X
m
n ,A,<) be
the following second order formula which says that Xmn is the code of A with respect to <:
∀x1, . . . ,∀xm
(
Xmn (x1, . . . , xm) ↔
∨
1im
φi
)
where φi is the conjunction of the following formulas3:
• ∧ j∑t<i kt x j = 0.• ∧ j>∑ti kt x j = 0.
• ∧ j∈1+∑ti kt ,...,ki+∑ti kt x j = 0∧ R(x1+∑ti kt − 1, . . . , xki+∑ti kt − 1).
Let C ⊆ dom(<)m . The relation C is a code of a model isomorphic to A (with respect to <) iff
∃Pk11 ∃Pk22 , . . . ,∃Pknn ∃T((
φbij
(
T , A,dom(<)
)∧∧1in φi)∧ψ(C, (dom(<), Pk11 , . . . , Pknn ),<)),
where φbij(T , A,dom(<)) says that T is a bijection from A to dom(<), ψ is deﬁned above and φi is the following formula:
∀x1, . . . ,∀xki
(
Ri(x1, . . . , xki ) ↔ Pkii
(
T (x1), . . . , T (xki )
))
. 
Lemma 2.5. (a) Let φ be a second order formula in a ﬁnite vocabulary τ , A a model of cardinality κ in H(κ+) with vocabulary τ ,
and let s be an assignment of the free variables of φ in A. Then there is a formula θ in the language of set theory such that A |s φ ⇔
H(κ+) | θ(A, s). More generally for any nth order formula φ and an assignment s containing the free variables of φ in its domain,
there is a formula θ in the language of set theory such that (H((n−2(κ))+),∈) | θ(A, s) ⇔A |s φ .
(b) Let τ be a ﬁnite vocabulary and assume we have ﬁxed some second order deﬁnable way to code models in the vocabulary τ
by subsets of κm with respect to a given well-order in order-type κ of the universe of the model. There is a mapping φ → φ∗ from
the set of Z F (I)-sentences4 to the set of L2-sentences in vocabulary τ such that (H(κ+), IA,∈) | φ ⇔ A | φ∗ for any model A of
cardinality κ in vocabulary τ . More generally, there is a mapping φ → φ∗n from the set of Z F (I)-sentences to the set of Ln-sentences
in vocabulary τ such that for any model A of cardinality κ with vocabulary τ
(
H
(
n−2(κ)+
)
, IA,∈
) | φ ⇔ A | φ∗n.
Proof. (a) Assignments of ﬁnitely many ﬁrst order and second order variables in the model A belong to H(κ+). To formalize
truth deﬁnition of φ in A with an assignment s we need only quantify over those assignments which are in H(κ+).
Generally third order variables are sets of second order variables and have cardinality at most 2κ , fourth order variables
have cardinality at most 2(2
κ ) , and so on. It follows that interpretations of ﬁnitely many nth order variables belong to
H((n−2(κ))+) and the truth deﬁnition of an nth order formula φ with an assignment s in a model A can be formalized in
H((n−2(κ))+) with A and s as parameters.
(b) In second order logic we can quantify over transitive closures of the sets in H(κ+) in the following way. If R is a
well-founded binary relation which satisﬁes the extensionality axiom ∀x∀y(∀z(Rzx ↔ Rzy) → x = y), then (dom(R), R) is
by Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem isomorphic to a transitive set. If R is also either empty or has a greatest element, then
(dom(R), R) is isomorphic to (T C(a), 
) for some a ∈ H(κ+). On the other hand, if a ∈ H(κ+) then |T C(a)|  κ and there
is a well-founded and extensional relation Ra ⊂ A × A such that (dom(Ra), Ra) is isomorphic to (T C(a), 
). Thus in second
order logic we can in a sense quantify over transitive closures of sets in H(κ+).
Let ψ(R) be a second order formula which says that R is a well-founded binary relation which satisﬁes the extensionality
axiom and is either empty or has a greatest element.
We can deﬁne two sets R and R ′ to be equal if and only if there is an isomorphism from (dom(R), R) to (dom(R ′), R ′).
Now we can deﬁne x =∗ y to be ψ(Rx)∧ψ(R y)∧ (dom(Rx), Rx) ∼= (dom(R y), R y).
We can deﬁne ∈ as follows: Rx ∈∗ R y iff ∃v∃w∃Q ∃T θ , where θ expresses the conjunction of the following:
1. v is the greatest element of R y .
2. R y(w, v).
3 To be precise the formulas below, such as x j = 0, are not formulas in our language. However 0, immediate predecessor of an element and immediate
successor of an element (all with respect to <) are deﬁnable so it is possible to write the expressions below formally.
4 This means we have added an extra unary predicate I to H(κ+) and interpreted it as the set of those subsets of κm which are codes of models
isomorphic to A. A Z F (I)-sentence is a ﬁrst order sentence in the vocabulary {∈, I}, where ∈ is a binary relation symbol and I is a unary relation symbol.
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4. T is an isomorphism from (dom(Rx), Rx) to Q .
Let then x ∈∗ y = ψ(Rx)∧ψ(R y)∧ ∃x∃y∃Q ∃T θ .
Let then (¬φ)∗ = ¬(φ∗), (φ ∧ θ)∗ = φ∗ ∧ θ∗ and (∃xφ)∗ = ∃Rxφ∗ .
We deﬁne I(x)∗ = ψ(Rx) ∧ ∃K∃ < ∃Rmn ∃RH∃R<′ ∃T (ψκ(K ,<) ∧ ψcode(Rmn ,A,<) ∧ θ∗(RH , R<′ , Rx) ∧ φ∼=(T , K ,<, Rmn , RH ,
R<′ , Rx)). Here are explanations for the parts of the formula.
• The formula ψκ deﬁnes the model (κ,∈) up to isomorphism.
• The formula ψcode(Rmn ,A,<) says that Rmn is a code, with respect to <, of a model isomorphic to A.• The ZF-formula θ says that H is a cardinal, <′ is the natural order of H and x⊆ Hm .
• The formula φ∼=(T , K ,<, Rmn , RH , R<′ , Rx) says that T is an isomorphism from (K ,<, Rmn ) to (RH , R<′ , Rx).
Next we will generalize the above result for n > 2. First we will deﬁne the concept of a hereditarily monadic variable. For
a start we say that a monadic second order variable is hereditarily monadic. If we have deﬁned what it means for an nth
order variable to be hereditarily monadic, we deﬁne an n + 1st order variable to be hereditarily monadic iff it has arity 1
and its only argument is a relation of one type: hereditarily monadic nth order variable. It is easy to prove by induction that
in a model of cardinality κ there are n−1(κ) hereditarily monadic nth order relations, i.e., interpretations of hereditarily
monadic nth order variables.
Now the above proof works for Ln+1 when we replace ﬁrst order variables by hereditarily monadic nth order variables
and second order variables of arity m by n + 1st order variables which have as arguments only hereditarily monadic nth
order variables.
We denote An = {A: A is a hereditarily monadic nth order relation over A}. Thus |An| = 2n−1(κ) and in Ln+1 we can
quantify over subsets of (An × An). Certain subsets B of An × An correspond to transitive closures of sets in H((2n−1 (κ))+),
namely those sets B such that (dom(B), B) satisﬁes the axiom of extensionality, B has a largest element and B is well-
founded. As before, we can deﬁne two sets of the above form to be the same if they are isomorphic and a set a belongs to
another set b if and only if there is an element b0 in the domain of b which belongs to the greatest element in b, and the
transitive closure of b0 with respect to b is isomorphic to a. The relation IA is deﬁnable up to isomorphism in the same
way as in the case of second order logic. 
2.2. Inﬁnitary second order languages
We will next deﬁne the second order inﬁnitary language L2κ,ω . The nth order inﬁnitary languages L
n
κ,ω can be deﬁned in
an analogous way.
Deﬁnition 2.6. Let κ be a regular cardinal. The logic L2κ,ω is the smallest logic which
1. Contains all second order atomic formulas.
2. Is closed under negation, conjunctions of size less than κ , disjunctions of size less than κ , ﬁrst order existential and
universal quantiﬁers and second order existential and universal quantiﬁers.5
Lemma 2.7. Let κ be a regular cardinal. In the logic Lκ,ω all ordinals (α,<) smaller than κ are characterizable.
Proof. We deﬁne by induction formulas θα(x) for α < κ .
∧
β<α
∃y(y < x∧ θβ(y))∧ ∀y
(
y < x→
∨
β<α
θβ(y)
)
.
The formula ∃x(ψLO ∧ θα(x)∧ ¬∃y x< y), where ψLO is the conjunction of the axioms of linear order, characterizes the
ordinal α. 
We will now present a lemma which is needed to show the independence of A(L2κ,ω, κ) from ZFC at a regular cardinal κ .
In [10] in Deﬁnition 1.2.13 an exact coding of L2κ,ω-formulas as set theoretic objects is given to prove the lemma.
Lemma 2.8. Let n ∈ω. Every formula of L2
κ+,ω can be deﬁned in (V ,∈) (or in (H((κ+)+),∈)) by a ZF-formula using a subset of κ as
a parameter.
If κ is an inaccessible cardinal, every formula of L2κ,ω can be deﬁned in (V ,∈) (or in (H(κ+),∈)) by a ZF-formula using a subset of
some λ < κ as a parameter.
5 We allow here both second order relation variables and second order function variables.
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3.1. A(L2,ω) and L2-deﬁnable well-order of the reals
In this section we will present two theorems of Ajtai which show that A(L2,ω) is independent of ZFC. After that we will
discuss some related topics concerning countable models. We will now present for completeness the proof of the ﬁrst part
of the independence result:
Theorem 3.1. (See Ajtai [2].) If there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the power set of ω, then A(L2,ω) holds. If the well-order
is Σ1n for n 2, then A(Σ1n+1,ω) holds.
Proof. We will show that if there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals, A(Σ1k ,ω) holds for certain k. Let us
assume our second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals is Δ1n for some n 2.
As we have shown in Lemma 2.4, a model of cardinality ℵ0 in a ﬁnite vocabulary is isomorphic to some models which
have ω as universe. These models can be coded into n-ary relations on ω in an up to isomorphism second order deﬁnable
way, and the set I of codes of models which have ω as their universe and are isomorphic to the model in question is up to
isomorphism second order deﬁnable in the model in question. As there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals
and a second order characterizable bijection from ωn to ω, we can talk in second order logic about the least subset A0 of ω
which is mapped to a set in I by the bijection. For each natural number n we can say in second order logic that n belongs
to A0, and also that n does not belong to A0. If two countable models in a ﬁnite vocabulary have the same second order
theory then they have the same set A0. Consequently they have the same isomorphism type and they are isomorphic.
We will next write formally the sentences described in the above paragraph and calculate the complexity of them. Let
Φ be the second order sentence:
∃N∃0′∃1′∃ +′ ∃ ·′ ∃ < ∃πn∃ A¯0∃A′0∃A∗0(
def
(
N,0′,1′,+′, ·′)∧ def(πn)∧ θ A¯0,τ
∧ψ∼=( A¯0)∧ φcode
(
A¯0, A′0
)∧ ηn(A′0, A∗0)
∧ ∀ A¯1∀A′1∀A∗1
((
θ A¯1,τ ∧ψ∼=( A¯1)∧ φcode
(
A¯1, A′1
)∧ ηn(A′1, A∗1))
→ (φ′(A∗0, A∗1)∨ ∀x(A∗0(x) ↔ A∗1(x))))∧ A∗0(47)). (3.2)
Here are explanations of the different components of the sentence:
• def(N,0′,1′,+′, ·′) is the Π11 -formula which deﬁnes the structure (N,0,1,+, ·).• def(πn) is the ﬁrst order formula which deﬁnes a bijection from Nn to N .
• θ A¯0,τ is a ﬁrst order formula which says that A¯0 is a sequence of relations on N such that the arities correspond to
arities of relations in τ .
• ψ∼=( A¯0) is a Σ11 formula which says that A (i.e., the model itself) is isomorphic to A¯0.
• φcode( A¯0, A′0) is the ﬁrst order formula which says that A′0 is the subset of Nn which codes A¯0, see Lemma 2.4.• ηn(A′0, A∗0) is the ﬁrst order formula which says that A∗0 is the image of A′0 under πn .
• φ′(A∗0, A∗1) is the Δ1n-formula which says that A∗0 is strictly smaller than A∗1 in the well-order of the power set of N
deﬁned by φ′ . The formula φ′ is formed from φ by replacing 0 by 0′ , 1 by 1′ , + by +′ , · by ·′ and by relativising all the
ﬁrst order and second order quantiﬁers to N .
• A∗0(47) is the ﬁrst order formula which says that the natural number 47 (in the sense of N) belongs to A∗0. Similarly
we could say by a ﬁrst order formula that n belongs to (or does not belong to) A∗0 for any chosen n.
The formula
((
θ A¯1,τ ∧ψ∼=( A¯1)∧ φcode
(
A¯1, A
′
1
)∧ ηn(A′1, A∗1))
→ (φ′(A∗0, A∗1)∨ ∀x(A∗0(x) ↔ A∗1(x))))
has the same complexity as ¬φ′(A∗0, A∗1), which is Δ1n , as φ′ is Δ1n . Then the formula
∀ A¯1∀A′1∀A∗1
((
θ A¯1,τ ∧ψ∼=( A¯1)∧ φcode
(
A¯1, A
′
1
)∧ ηn(A′1, A∗1))
→ (φ′(A∗0, A∗1)∨ ∀x(A∗0(x) ↔ A∗1(x))))
has complexity Π1n . Now the formula
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def
(
N,0′,1′,+′, ·′)∧ def(πn)∧ θ A¯0,τ
∧ψ∼=( A¯0)∧ φcode
(
A¯0, A′0
)∧ ηn(A′0, A∗0)
∧ ∀ A¯1∀A′1∀A∗1
((
θ A¯1,τ ∧ψ∼=( A¯1)∧ φcode
(
A¯1, A′1
)∧ ηn(A′1, A∗1))
→ (φ′(A∗0, A∗1)∨ ∀x(A∗0(x) ↔ A∗1(x))))∧ A∗0(47))
has complexity Π1n and the formula (3.2) has complexity Σ
1
n+1. The sentence Φ is true in A, hence true in B. So A∼=B.
Thus A(Σ1n+1,ω) has been proved. 
Corollary 3.3. (See Ajtai [2].) If V = L then A(L2,ω) holds.
Proof. In L there is a Δ12 well-ordering of the power set of ω. 
As there is a Δ12 well-order of the reals in L, Σ
1
3 -equivalence implies isomorphism for countable models in L. More
generally, if there is a Σ1n well-order of the reals, any two countable Σn+1-equivalent models are isomorphic. Hence they
are second order equivalent and the full second order theory of a countable model is determined by its Σn+1-theory.
However, it does not follow that every second order sentence is equivalent to a Σ1n+1 sentence for countable models [18]
(Corollary 14.5 VIII(b)).
Corollary 3.4. (See Ajtai [2], Harrington [5].) A(L2,ω) is consistent with V = L, even with the failure of the Continuum Hypothesis.
Proof. By a result of Harrington [5] it is consistent with ZFC that the continuum is as big as desired but has a Δ13-deﬁnable
well-order. 
If we have a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals with a parameter6 r then any two countable models which
satisfy the same second order theory with parameter r are isomorphic. This can be seen by just adding a parameter to the
proof of Theorem 3.1. However, in this article we do not give much attention to the case where we allow parameters: We
are generally interested in the possibility to determine isomorphism types of models by their theories in languages having
sentences smaller than the cardinality of the model. Thus using a real parameter in a language to determine isomorphism
type of a countable model (a real) is a bit disappointing.
However, we note the following result of Harrington [5]: It is consistent with ZFC that Martin’s Axiom holds, the contin-
uum is as big as wanted and there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals using a real parameter. It follows that
there is a model of ZFC in which the following hold:
1. Martin’s Axiom.
2. For some real parameter r, second order equivalence with the real parameter r implies isomorphism for countable
models.
Open Question 3.5. Is Martin’s Axiom consistent with A(L2,ω)?
A second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals is also consistent with measurable and Woodin cardinals, which cannot
exist in L. We will return to these large cardinals in Section 7.
By Theorem 3.1 A(L2,ω) is consistent. In all our examples where A(L2,ω) holds this is based on a second order deﬁnable
well-order of the reals.
Open Question 3.6. Is it consistent with ZFC that A(L2,ω) holds, but there is no second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals?
3.2. Optimality
We proved before that A(Σ13 ,ω) is consistent with ZFC. Let us observe that A(Σ
1
1 ,ω) is simply false in ZFC.
Theorem 3.7. For any inﬁnite cardinal κ there are two non-isomorphic Σ11 -equivalent models of Peano Axioms of cardinality κ . In
particular there are two non-isomorphic countable Σ11 -equivalent models of Peano Axioms.
6 The logic for second order logic with a real parameter is L2(Qr), the second order logic with a generalized quantiﬁer Qr . The quantiﬁer Qr is deﬁned
as A | Qr(x)φ(x) ⇔ |{x: A | φ(x)}| ∈ r. Note that if we have (ω,<) in the model (either in the vocabulary of the model or as interpretation of second
order variables) then the formula ψ(X) = ∀x(X(x) ↔ Qr y(y < x)) deﬁnes the real r as a subset of ω.
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standard model of arithmetic. If Aα has been deﬁned we choose Aα+1 to be an elementary extension which realizes some
new type. Thus all the models in the chain become pairwise non-isomorphic. To make some of the models in chain Σ11 -
equivalent, we make sure that the Σ11 sentences true in the models of the chain are increasing. Thus for each Σ
1
1 formula∃Rφ which is true in the standard model of arithmetic we put a new relation to the vocabulary of A0 and interpret it in
such a way that the formula φ is satisﬁed. If Aα+1 satisﬁes some Σ11 sentences (in the original vocabulary) which are not
true in Aα then we add new relations to the model so that every Σ11 sentence is satisﬁed by a relation in the model. Since
there are only countably many Σ11 sentences, there is such an α < ω1 that from α forward all models in the chain are
Σ11 -equivalent in the original vocabulary. Thus from some α forward, all models in the chain are Σ
1
1 -equivalent but not
isomorphic.
The above proof works for all cardinalities ℵα < 2ℵ0 . In any cardinality greater than or equal to 2ℵ0 there are more than
2ℵ0 many non-isomorphic models of arithmetic, so the claim follows.
The theorem above is formulated for Peano Axioms, but the proof works equally well for any theory which has 2ℵ0 many
types and more than continuum many non-isomorphic models in all cardinalities greater than or equal to the continuum.
Open Question 3.8. Is it consistent with ZFC that A(Σ12 ,ω) holds?
Open Question 3.9. If V = L, are there two countable non-isomorphic models which have the same monadic second order theory?
3.3. Failure of A(L2,ω)
We will now recall the second part of the independence proof of Ajtai [2]:
Theorem 3.10. (See Ajtai [2].) It is consistent with ZFC, that there are two countable non-isomorphic models which satisfy the same
formulas of the language of set theory. In particular the models are second order equivalent and Ln-equivalent for all n.
In the proof of Theorem 3.10 one Cohen-generic real is added to the set theoretic universe, and as a result there will be
two second order equivalent non-isomorphic countable models in the generic extension. But actually by a little modiﬁcation
of the proof, we can add many generic reals to the universe and get many countable second order equivalent non-isomorphic
models.
Theorem 3.11. Let κ+ be an inﬁnite cardinal. There is a notion of forcing P that preserves cardinals and forces that there are κ+
countable ZF-equivalent non-isomorphic models.
Proof. We add κ+ many Cohen-generic reals to the ground model. Forcing conditions are ﬁnite functions from κ+ ×ω to
{0,1}. A forcing condition p is stronger than another forcing condition q iff p extends q. If G is a generic set for this notion
of forcing, for all α < κ+ , fα = {n: G(α,n) = 1} is a generic real. Note that for all α < β < κ+ , fα and fβ differ in inﬁnitely
many points. If A is a subset of ω, we denote by F A the set of all subsets of ω which differ from A only in ﬁnitely many
points. We are discussing the models (F fα ∪ω,<ω, P fα ), where <ω is the natural order of ω and P fα is the relation which
tells which natural numbers n belong to which sets in F fα .7
Let us denote the models constructed around fα and fβ as described above by M fα and M fβ . We will show that the
models are ZF-equivalent. Assume not: then there is a forcing condition p and a ZF-sentence φ with possibly parameters
from the ground model such that p  φ(M˙ fα ) ∧ ¬φ(M˙ fβ ). So, suppose G is a generic ﬁlter over V containing p such that
V G | φ(M fα ) ∧ ¬φ(M fβ ). Consider the following mapping Hp,α,β : dom(P ) → dom(P ). Let Hp,α,β( f ) = g such that the
following hold:
• g(γ ,n) = f (γ ,n), if (γ ,n) ∈ dom(p) and (γ ,n) ∈ dom( f ).
• g(γ ,n) = f (γ ,n), if γ ∈ κ+ \ {α,β} and (γ ,n) ∈ dom( f ).
• g(α,n) = f (α,n), if (β,n) ∈ dom(p) and (α,n) ∈ dom( f ).
• g(β,n) = f (β,n), if (α,n) ∈ dom(p) and (β,n) ∈ dom( f ).
• g(α,n) = f (β,n), if (β,n) ∈ dom( f ) \ dom(p) and (α,n) /∈ dom(p).
• g(β,n) = f (α,n), if (α,n) ∈ dom( f ) \ dom(p) and (β,n) /∈ dom(p).
• g(γ ,n) not deﬁned, if none of the above conditions applies.
Let us denote the image of G under F p,α,β by G ′ . As F p,α,β is an automorphism of P , G ′ is a generic ﬁlter. The generic
ﬁlter G ′ agrees with G in all ordinals different from α and β , and if at least one of {(α,n), (β,n)} belongs to dom(p) then
7 In fact the union of the relations <ω and P fα is ∈, so we could also form the model in vocabulary {∈} instead of {<ω, P fα }. We follow here Ajtai,
whose vocabulary is maybe more intuitive than the alternative vocabulary.
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ﬁlter G ′ changes digits of α to digits of β and vice versa. Now V G = V G ′ , p ∈ G ′ and the interpretations of ˙M fα and ˙M fβ
swap places in the two generic extensions. Thus it is impossible that p  φ( ˙M fα )∧ ¬φ( ˙M fβ ).
But (F fα ∪ω,<ω, P fα ) and (F fβ ∪ω,<ω, P fβ ) are non-isomorphic: Since ω is a rigid structure, in an isomorphism every
set in F fα should be mapped to exactly the same set in F fβ . But this is impossible because fα /∈ F fβ . 
The proof of Theorem 3.10 is the same: the non-isomorphic second order equivalent models MG and M−G are con-
structed from the Cohen-generic real G and its complement −G .
4. Fourth order logic
4.1. Coding subsets by collapsing cardinals
In Section 3 we saw that A(L2,ω) is independent of ZFC. A natural question is whether analogous results can be proved
for other higher order logics Ln or various uncountable cardinals κ . Our results in this section were inspired by the following
theorem of Ajtai [2]:
Theorem 4.1. (See Ajtai [2].) There is a model of ZFC in which A(Ln,ω) fails for every n ∈ω but A(Z F ,ω) holds.
Next we will give some motivation to our deﬁnition of a forcing P X ′,κ , which is used a lot in this section. The forcing
uses some ideas of Kenneth McAloon [15].
Assume M = L[X], λ is a cardinal and X ⊆ λ. Assume also that M and L have the same cardinals, κ = ℵMα is a cardinal
in M and GCH holds above κ in M . We will next introduce the forcing P X ′,κ , which makes X deﬁnable from κ , but does
not add any new subsets to κ . Let X ′ be a subset of λ \ {β: β is a limit ordinal} such that X ′ and X contain the same
information.8 The forcing is an iterated forcing of length λ with full support at all limit stages. The idea is that P X ′,κ
collapses ℵα+ω·β+2 to ℵα+ω·β+1 for β ∈ X ′ , and does not collapse any other cardinals. After the forcing, X ′ (and hence X) is
deﬁnable from α as X ′ = {β < λ: ℵLα+ω·β+2 is not a cardinal}. Next we will give an exact deﬁnition of the forcing conditions.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (P X ′,κ ). The forcing conditions are sequences (pβ)β<λ such that the following hold:
1. If 0 ∈ X ′ , then P0 is the set of partial functions from ℵα+1 to ℵα+2 of cardinality smaller than ℵα+1. A forcing condition
p is stronger than a forcing condition q if and only if p extends q. If 0 /∈ X ′ , then P0 is the trivial forcing.
2. Assume β = γ + 1 and Pγ ′ has been deﬁned for all γ ′  γ .
If β ∈ X ′ , we deﬁne Pβ to be the set of sequences pγ ,γ  β where the γ th coordinate belongs to Pγ for each γ < β
and the βth coordinate is a forcing name Y˙ such that p  β  “Y˙ is a partial function from ℵα+ω·β+1 to ℵα+ω·β+2 of
cardinality smaller than ℵα+ω·β+1”. If p and q are two conditions of length β then p is stronger than q if and only if
p  γ is stronger than q  γ and p  β  “p(β) and q(β) are partial functions from ℵα+ω·β+1 to ℵα+ω·β+2 of cardinality
smaller than ℵα+ω·β+1 and p(α) ⊇ q(α)”.
If β /∈ X ′ then Pβ is the trivial forcing.
3. If β is a limit ordinal, the forcing conditions in Pβ are the sequences p of length β such that for each γ < β p  γ 
p(γ ) ∈ Pγ . This forcing has full support in all limit stages, which means that in limit stages all coordinates of a forcing
condition may be non-zero. A forcing condition p is stronger than q if and only if p  γ is stronger than q  γ for each
γ < β .
Lemma 4.3. Assume M = L[X], λ is a cardinal, X ⊆ λ and X ′ = {α + 1: α ∈ X}. Assume also that M and L have the same cardinals
and GCH holds above κ in M. Let G be a P X ′,κ -generic set over M. M[G] | X ′ = {β < λ: ℵLα+ω·β+2 is not a cardinal}.
Proof. We prove by induction on β that after Pβ the claim holds for all γ  β , i.e., for all γ  β , ℵLα+ω·γ+2 is a cardinal iff
γ ∈ X ′ . The rest of the iterated forcing is < ℵα+ω·(β+1)-closed and does not add subsets of ℵα+ω·β+1 so the claim follows.
1. Let β = 0. If 0 /∈ X ′ then P0 is the trivial forcing and the claim holds. If β ∈ X ′ then Pβ collapses ℵα+ω·β+2 to ℵα+ω·β+1.
The forcing Pβ is < ℵα+ω·β+1-closed and has cardinality ℵα+ω·β+2 (because GCH holds above κ = ℵα), so other cardi-
nals and GCH above κ are preserved.
2. Let β = γ +1 and assume Induction Hypothesis holds for γ . If β /∈ X ′ then Pβ is the trivial forcing and the claim holds.
If β ∈ X ′ then Pβ collapses ℵα+ω·β+2 to ℵα+ω·β+1. Note that Pβ is < ℵα+ω·β+1-closed and has cardinality ℵα+ω·β+2,
because GCH above κ holds. It follows that Pβ preserves other cardinals. Also GCH above κ is preserved so the claim
holds.
8 For example for all α < λ : α ∈ X ↔ α + 1 ∈ X ′ .
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at most ℵα+ω·β so it does not collapse any cardinals greater than ℵα+ω·β . Also ℵα+ω·β is not collapsed because there
are coﬁnally many cardinals below which are not collapsed. GCH above κ is also preserved.
4. The whole forcing P X ′,κ has cardinality at most ℵα+ω·λ so cardinals greater than ℵα+ω·λ are preserved. The cardinal
ℵα+ω·λ itself is preserved, as coﬁnally many cardinals below it are preserved. 
Theorem 4.4. Let κ be a cardinal in L. There is a model of ZFC in which 2κ = 2ℵ0 , A(L4, κ) holds, A(L2, κ) fails and all cardinals  κ
of L are preserved.
Proof. Let L be the ground model. We make an iterated forcing which has three parts and length κ+ + 1. After the forcing
fourth order equivalence implies isomorphism in cardinality κ but second order equivalence does not:
1. First we add 2κ Cohen-subsets of ω. This forcing does not collapse any cardinals and after the forcing 2ℵ0 = 2κ .
2. Now let G be the generic set we added in step 1. and let Π be a bijection from 2ℵ0 to 2κ in V [G]. We want to make G
and Π deﬁnable from κ in the language of set theory, but not to make them up to isomorphism second order deﬁnable
in cardinality κ .
As G and Π are of cardinality 2κ = κ+ , there is a subset X of 2κ which codes them both. Let X ′ be a subset of
2κ \ {γ : γ is 0 or a limit ordinal} such that X and X ′ are deﬁnable from each other. We will now make one such X ′
deﬁnable from κ in the language of set theory. Let X˙ ′ be a forcing name for X ′ . After step 1. of this iterated forcing the
GCH holds above κ , X˙ ′ has cardinality 2κ , and the cardinals are the same as in L, so by Lemma 4.3 P0 ∗ P X˙ ′,κ does not
add any new subsets of κ and makes X˙ ′ deﬁnable from κ in the language set theory.
3. In the last step we add ℵα+ω·κ++1 Cohen subsets of κ+ . This does not collapse cardinals or add new subsets of κ . Now
X˙ ′ is deﬁnable in (H((2(κ))+),∈) with α as parameter, as X˙ ′ = {β: ℵLα+ω·β+2 is not a cardinal}. In (H((2(κ))+),∈,
IA) X˙ ′ is deﬁnable without parameters. As X˙ ′ codes G , the canonical well-order of L[G] up to sets of cardinality κ is
deﬁnable as well. As X˙ ′ codes also a bijection from 2ℵ0 to 2κ , by Lemma 2.5, there is a fourth order deﬁnable well-order
of the power set of κ and an up to isomorphism fourth order deﬁnable bijection from the power set of κ to the reals.
Now, as in Theorem 3.1, we can have fourth order sentences which say “There are R0 ⊆ κ and R ′0 ⊆ ω such that R0 is
the least subset in the well-order isomorphic to the model in question and Π maps R0 to R ′0 and R ′0(8743)”. Sentences
of this form determine the isomorphism type of the model so A(L4, κ) holds after the forcing. A(L2, κ) fails after the
forcing as it fails after the ﬁrst Cohen forcing9 and we did not add any subsets of κ after that. 
Theorem 4.5. Let κ be a cardinal in L. There is a model of ZFC in which 2κ = 2ℵ0 , and A(L4, λ) holds and A(L2, λ) fails in any
cardinality λ κ .
Proof. Let L be the ground model. We use an iterated forcing which has the following steps:
1. We add 2κ = κ+ Cohen subsets of ω. Cardinals are preserved in this forcing and after this forcing 2λ = 2κ = κ+ for any
λ κ . Also A(L2, λ) fails for all λ κ , see Theorem 6.7 below.
2. Now let G be the generic set we added in step 1 and let {Πλ: λ κ} be a set such that each Πλ is a bijection from
2ℵ0 to 2λ in V [G]. Let X˙ ′ be a subset of 2κ \ {γ : γ is 0 or a limit ordinal} which codes G and all the bijections Πλ .
As in the previous theorem P0 ∗ P X˙ ′,κ makes X ′ deﬁnable from κ and adds the same subsets of κ as P0 alone.
3. In the last step we add ℵα+ω·κ++1 Cohen subsets of 2κ .
After the forcing A(L2, λ) fails for every λ κ as we did not add any new subsets of λ after step 1. After the forcing
A(L4, λ) holds for all λ  κ as in H(2(λ)+) there is a deﬁnable well-order of the power set of λ and a deﬁnable
bijection from 2λ to 2ω . 
Theorem 4.6. Let κ be a cardinal in L and let n be a natural number greater than or equal to 2. There is a model of ZFC in which
A(Ln, κ) fails but A(Ln+2, κ) holds.
Proof. Let L be the ground model. Our iterated forcing has the following steps:
1. We add 2κ Cohen subsets of ω. After this step A(Ln, κ) fails for every n, 2κ = 2ω , GCH holds above κ and all cardinals
of L remain cardinals.
2. Let X˙ ′ be a forcing name for a subset of κ+ \ {γ : γ is a limit ordinal or 0} which codes the generic set added in step 1
and a bijection Π from 2ω to 2κ . The second step is P X˙ ′,n−2(κ) This step does not add any subsets of n−2(κ).
3. Cohen forcing which adds ℵα+ω·2κ+1 subsets of n−1(κ).
9 Theorem 3.10 proves this for κ =ω and Theorem 6.7 below proves the uncountable case.
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After the forcing X˙ ′ is deﬁnable in H((n(κ))+) and thus there is an up to isomorphism Ln+2-deﬁnable well-order
of the power set of κ and an up to isomorphism Ln+2-deﬁnable bijection from 2κ to 2ω . It follows that A(Ln+2, κ)
holds. 
Note that there are several open questions left, for example the following:
Open Question 4.7. Does A(Ln+1, κ) hold after the above forcing? Or does it depend on κ and n whether A(Ln+1, κ) holds after the
above forcing?
Theorem 4.8. Let κ be a cardinal deﬁnable in L. There is a model of ZFC in which A(Ln, κ) fails for every n but A(Z F , κ) holds and all
cardinals  κ of L are preserved.
Proof. This is just an obvious generalization of Ajtai’s Theorem 4.1. Note that the theorem could be also proved by using
the forcing P X,κ . Let L be the ground model. We do an iterated forcing with two steps:
1. Let P0 be a forcing which adds 2κ = κ+ Cohen subsets of ω. After this forcing there are two ZF-equivalent non-
isomorphic models of cardinality κ in a ﬁnite vocabulary. The models are also Ln-equivalent for any natural number n.
This forcing does not collapse any cardinals and also GCH above κ is preserved. After this forcing 2κ = 2ω .
2. In the second step we make the Cohen subset G which we added in step 1 and a bijection Π from 2κ to 2ω deﬁnable
in the language of set theory. We make this in such a way, that the truth of all Ln sentences in models of cardinality κ
is preserved, and after the forcing the power set of κ has a ZF-deﬁnable well-order and there is a ZF-deﬁnable bijection
from 2κ to 2ω . Consequently A(Z F , κ) holds after the forcing.
As κ is a deﬁnable cardinal in L, also ℵκ+ω is a deﬁnable cardinal in L. As GCH holds above κ in L[G], the truth of Ln
sentences in models of cardinality κ in L[G] is determined by sets which are hereditarily smaller than ℵκ+ω . We will
introduce a forcing which makes G and Π deﬁnable in the language of set theory but does not add any sets which are
hereditarily smaller than ℵκ+ω .
Let X ⊆ κ+ be a set which codes G and Π . Let P1 be a forcing which adds ℵκ+ω+α+2 Cohen subsets of ℵκ+ω+α for
those α for which α ∈ X . After the forcing we can read X as the function from κ+ to {0,1} which maps α to 0 if GCH
holds at ℵκ+ω+α and to 1 otherwise. Now as X is deﬁnable by a ZF-formula we have a ZF-deﬁnable well-order of the
power set of κ and a ZF-deﬁnable bijection from 2κ to 2ω . It follows that A(Z F , κ) holds. 
5. Generalized quantiﬁers
5.1. The countable case
In this section we investigate whether higher order logics can be replaced in the above results by a logic with generalized
quantiﬁers. A clear limitation is provided by the following result [6]:
Theorem 5.1. (See Hella [6].) Let n be a natural number. Let {Q i: i ∈ I} be a set of generalized quantiﬁers of arity n and let κ be any
inﬁnite cardinal. Then there are two models of cardinality κ which are L({Q i: i ∈ I})-equivalent but not isomorphic.
In view of the above theorem, in order to characterize all models of an inﬁnite cardinality by their theories in a logic
L({Q i: i ∈ I}), the arity of the generalized quantiﬁers of the logic has to increase beyond any ﬁnite bound. On the other
hand, if we let the arity grow we can ﬁnd a generalized quantiﬁer logic L such that A(L, κ) holds provably in ZFC. We will
next give the deﬁnition of the above mentioned language in case κ =ω.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let (Ar)r∈R be an indexing of all countable models in ﬁnite vocabularies by real numbers, i.e., for any
countable model A in a ﬁnite vocabulary there is exactly one r ∈R such that A is isomorphic to Ar .
The language L∗ = L(Qr,s: r, s ∈ Q) contains atomic formulas, is closed under negation, conjunction and ﬁrst order
existential and universal quantiﬁers. L∗ is also closed under the quantiﬁers
Qr,s x¯
1, . . . , x¯n
(
φ1
(
x¯1
)
, . . . , φn
(
x¯n
))
(∗)
for all r, s ∈Q. The formulas φi above can be any formulas of L∗ with the given free variables. The notation x¯k is a shorthand
for xk1, . . . , x
k
Nk
, where xnm = xpo whenever m = o or n = p.
Recall that φM(·) = {x¯: M | φ(x¯)}. The formula (∗) is deﬁned to be true in a model M if and only if |M| = ℵ0 and
(M, φM1 (·), . . . , φMn (·)) is isomorphic to a structure At such that r < t < s.
We cannot prove in ZFC that there is any such indexing (Ar)r∈R of the countable models, which is deﬁnable in the
language of set theory. But we ﬁx one such indexing no matter whether it is deﬁnable or not.
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Proof. Let L∗ be as above. Let A be a countable model in a ﬁnite relational vocabulary (R1, . . . , Rn). Note that constants
can be coded into unary relations and n-ary functions can be coded into n + 1-ary relations so restriction to relational
vocabularies does not make the result less general. The sentence Qr0,s0 x¯
1, . . . , x¯n(R1(x¯1), . . . , Rn(x¯n)) is true in A if and only
if the r such that Ar is isomorphic to (A, RA1 , . . . , R
A
n ) is between r0 and s0. Suppose now A and B are two countable
non-isomorphic models in vocabulary τ . Then A is isomorphic to some Ap and B is isomorphic to some Aq for different p
and q. Let r0 and s0 be such that r0 < p < s0 and either q < r0 or s0 < q. Then
A | Qr0,s0 x¯1, . . . , x¯n
(
R1
(
x¯1
)
, . . . , Rn
(
x¯n
))
but
B | ¬Qr0,s0 x¯1, . . . , x¯n
(
R1
(
x¯1
)
, . . . , Rn
(
x¯n
))
. 
5.2. The uncountable case
Theorem 5.3 can be generalized to any inﬁnite cardinality as we will do next.
The proof is based on an idea of Per Lindström (Personal letter to Jouko Väänänen, 1 August 1974). First we will give the
deﬁnition of the relevant logic.
Deﬁnition 5.4. Let (A f ) f :κ→{0,1} be an indexing of all models of cardinality κ in ﬁnite vocabularies.
Deﬁne the sets Xα and X ′α as follows: Xα = { f : κ → {0,1}: f (α) = 0}, X ′α = { f : κ → {0,1}: f (α) = 1}.
Let Lκ∗ = L(Q Sα, RSα: α < κ, S a ﬁnite set of variables) contain atomic formulas, be closed under negation, conjunction
and ﬁrst order existential and universal quantiﬁers. Let S be any ﬁnite sequence of ﬁnite sequences of distinct variables
(S = (x¯1, . . . , x¯k)). Let Lκ∗ be also closed under the following quantiﬁers Q Sα and RSα :
Q Sα x¯
1, . . . , x¯k
(
φ1
(
x¯1
)
, . . . , φk
(
x¯k
))
RSα x¯
1, . . . , x¯k
(
φ1
(
x¯1
)
, . . . , φk
(
x¯k
))
.
The formula Q Sα x¯
1, . . . , x¯k(φ1(x¯1), . . . , φk(x¯k)) is true in a model M iff |M| = κ and (M, φM1 (·), . . . , φMk (·)) is isomorphic to
an A f such that f ∈ Xα .
The formula RSα x¯
1, . . . , x¯k(φ1(x¯1), . . . , φk(x¯k)) is true in a model M iff |M| = κ and (M, φM1 (·), . . . , φMk (·)) is isomorphic
to an A f such that f ∈ X ′α .
Note that there are countably many ﬁnite vocabularies, and for any ﬁnite vocabulary there are at most 2κ pairwise non-
isomorphic models of cardinality κ with the vocabulary. Thus an indexing (A f ) f :κ→{0,1} of all models of cardinality κ in
ﬁnite vocabularies always exists though may be impossible to deﬁne in the language of set theory.
Theorem 5.5. Let κ be an inﬁnite cardinal. There is a language Lκ∗ of cardinality κ such that A(Lκ∗, κ) holds.
Proof. Let Lκ∗ be as above. Any f : κ → {0,1} can be expressed as an intersection of κ many sets of the form Xα and X ′α ,
namely { f } =⋂{Xα: f (α) = 0} ∩⋂{X ′α: f (α) = 1}. On the other hand, if f and g are two different functions from κ to{0,1}, there is an Xα such that one of f and g belongs to Xα and the other does not.
As in the previous theorem, assume without loss of generality that a model A of cardinality κ has a relational vocabulary
R1, . . . , Rn .
The sentence Qα x¯1, . . . , x¯n(R1(x¯1), . . . , Rn(x¯n)) is true in a model A if and only if the f such that A f is isomorphic to
(A, RA1 , . . . , R
A
n ) belongs to Xα . The sentence Rα x¯
1, . . . , x¯n(R1(x¯1), . . . , Rn(x¯n)) is true in a model A if and only if the f such
that A f which is isomorphic to (A, RA1 , . . . , R
A
n ) belongs to X
′
α .
Suppose τ is a ﬁnite relational vocabulary (Rm11 , . . . , R
mn
n ) where the superscripts denote the arities of the relation
symbols. Let A and B be two non-isomorphic models of cardinality κ with vocabulary τ . Let P be a sequence of vari-
ables which corresponds to arities of the relation symbols, i.e., P = x¯1, . . . , x¯n such that each x¯p contains mp variables.
Now (A, R1(·)A, . . . , Rn(·)A) is isomorphic to some A f and (B, R1(·)B, . . . , Rn(·)B) is isomorphic to some Ag and f = g .
So there is a β such that one of f and g (say f ) gets value 0 at β and the other gets value 1. Now A | Q Pβ x¯1,
. . . , x¯n(R1(x¯1), . . . , Rn(x¯k)) but B | ¬Q Pβ x¯1, . . . , x¯n(R1(x¯1), . . . , Rn(x¯k)). 
10 This result and its proof is presented here with the permission of Professor Scott Weinstein.
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language must be unbounded. However, if we look at the proof above we see that if we want to characterize all models of
cardinality κ in a ﬁxed ﬁnite vocabulary, the arity of quantiﬁers in the language can be bounded.
6. Inﬁnitary second order languages
6.1. Discussion
We noted in Theorem 3.1 that A(L2,ω) is consistent with ZFC. But is A(L2,ℵ1) consistent with ZFC? It is easy to show
by a simple cardinality argument that A(L2,ℵ1) does not necessarily hold.
In any ﬁnite vocabulary with a binary predicate there are 2ℵ0 many L2-theories. In a ﬁnite vocabulary with a binary
predicate there are 2ℵ1 models of cardinality ℵ1 which are pairwise non-isomorphic. Thus if 2ℵ0 < 2ℵ1 , then there are two
second order equivalent non-isomorphic models of cardinality ℵ1. However, if 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 we don’t know what happens.
Open Question 6.1. Is it consistent with ZFC that 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 and A(L2,ℵ1) holds?
By appropriate coding, sentences of second order logic are natural numbers and second order theories are real numbers.
Via coding, countable models are also real numbers, so the question whether any two different reals of the latter type
correspond to two different reals of the former type is meaningful.
It is well known that all models of cardinality κ can be characterized up to isomorphism by an Lκ+,κ+ sentence. However,
these sentences have the same cardinality as the model in question. In this paper we are interested in the possibility of
characterizing models up to isomorphism by theories, where the sentences have cardinality smaller than the model.
We make the following observations about the possibility to characterize models up to isomorphism by inﬁnitary lan-
guages. In the countable cardinality of the models Lω1,ω-equivalence implies isomorphism. Generally L∞,ω-11equivalence
of two models is equivalent to the existence of a winning strategy for player II in Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game of length ω
between the models. Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game of length ω can distinguish any two non-isomorphic models only in the
countable cardinality, so L∞,ω is not good in characterizing uncountable models up to isomorphism. Nadel and Stavi [17]
have investigated logics L∞,λ and showed that these are not successful in characterizing all models up to isomorphism in
cardinality λ, where λ is an uncountable successor cardinal.
Thus inﬁnitary languages are not suﬃcient for characterizing all models up to isomorphism in an uncountable cardinal-
ity λ, if we don’t allow the inﬁnitary language to have sentences of cardinality λ. The logics Ln are also not very successful.
As they have only continuum many theories they cannot characterize all models in a cardinality which has more than
continuum-many non-isomorphic models.
6.2. Regular cardinals
We have introduced the inﬁnitary second order language L2κ,ω for a regular cardinal κ in the preliminaries. We will now
prove that it is independent of ZFC whether all models of cardinality κ in any ﬁnite vocabulary can be characterized up to
isomorphism by their L2κ,ω-theories. Sentences of L
2
κ,ω correspond to subsets of cardinals λ < κ so this logic is within the
scope of this paper.
If A is a model of cardinality κ , all sets in H(κ) are up to isomorphism L2κ,ω-deﬁnable in A. This is because the structure
of any set in H(κ) can be coded into a subset of an ordinal α < κ and, as we will see below in the proof of Theorem 6.3,
such a subset of α can be deﬁned up to isomorphism in A by an L2κ,ω-formula.
Theorem 6.2. If κ is a regular cardinal and there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the power set of κ , then A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds.
In particular A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds if V = L.
Proof. We omit the details as the proof is entirely similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. See also the proof of Theorem 6.3
below.
As in Theorem 3.1, a model can be coded into an n-ary relation R ⊆ κn . By Lemma 2.7 all ordinals smaller than κ are
characterizable. For all n-tuples of ordinals smaller than κ we can say whether the tuple belongs to or does not belong to
the least subset of κn in the well-order which is isomorphic with the model. The canonical well-order of L up to sets of
cardinality κ is up to isomorphism second order deﬁnable in any cardinality κ . 
In Theorem 6.2 we saw that A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds in L at any regular cardinal κ as there is a second order deﬁnable well-
order of the power set of κ . In fact we will get a better result.
11 L∞,ω is the union of the languages Lκ,ω , κ a regular cardinal.
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Proof. The idea is the following. Let A and B be two models of cardinality κ . By assumption A and B are isomorphic to
some sets in L[X]. In the inﬁnitary second order language L2κ,ω we can talk about the least subset of κn in the canonical
well-order of L[X] which is isomorphic to A. We will now describe how this is done.
In the next formula, which deﬁnes the set X up to isomorphism in a model of cardinality κ , we will use the formulas θα
from Lemma 2.7 to deﬁne the ordinals.
∃ <∗
(
φ(κ,
)
(
A,<∗
)∧ ∀x
(
P (x) ↔
∨
α∈X
θα(x)
))
.
In the above formula φ(κ,
) denotes the formula which deﬁnes (κ,<) up to isomorphism and A denotes the domain of
the model in question. We denote this formula which deﬁnes X up to isomorphism by φX .
If the set X and an ordinal α < κ+ are given, the αth level of the sets constructible from X is up to isomorphism second
order deﬁnable from these parameters. Also the canonical well-order of Lα[X] is second order deﬁnable on Lα[X] from X
and α. Let φLα [X](Y , X,α) be a second order formula which says that Y is the αth level of the sets constructible from X
(up to isomorphism) and let φ<Lα [X] (Z , X,α) be a second order formula which says that Z is the canonical well-order of
the αth level of the sets constructible from X (up to isomorphism).
As usual, we assume that the model in question has been coded into an n-ary relation R . We are interested in sentences
of the following form:
There are X , a, M , < and R0 such that the following hold:
1. φX (X).
2. a is an ordinal.
3. φLα [X](M, X,a).
4. φ<Lα [X] (<, X,a).
5. R0 ∈ M ∧ R0 ∼= R ∧ ∀R1((R1 ∈ M ∧ R1 ∼= R) → (R0 < R1 ∨ R0 = R1)).
6. (α1, . . . ,αn) ∈ R0.
The ﬁrst four formulas say that a is an ordinal, X is what it is supposed to be (up to isomorphism), M is La[X] (up
to isomorphism) and < is <La[X] (up to isomorphism). The ﬁfth formula says that R0 belongs to La[X] and it is the least
model in the canonical well-order of La[X] which is isomorphic to the model in question. The sixth formula says that a
tuple (α1, . . . ,αn) belongs to R0. Similarly we can say that a tuple does not belong to R0.
If two models of cardinality κ are now L2κ,ω-equivalent, then they satisfy all the same sentences of the form above. Thus
they have the same set R0 and consequently they are isomorphic. 
Corollary 6.4. It is consistent relative to the consistency of a measurable cardinal that there is a measurable cardinal κ and A(L2λ,ω,λ)
holds for any λ > 2κ .
Proof. There is a model of ZFC [19] such that there is a measurable cardinal κ and every set is constructible from a certain
subset of the power set of κ . 
Open Question 6.5. Are the following conditions equivalent?
1. There is an L2κ,ω-deﬁnable well-order of the power set of κ .
2. A(L2κ,ω, κ).
Ajtai proved the following theorem in case κ =ω, see Theorem 3.10.
Theorem 6.6. Let κ be a regular cardinal. It is consistent with ZFC that there are two ZF-equivalent non-isomorphic models of cardi-
nality κ . The models are also Lnκ,ω-equivalent for all n.
Proof. We add a Cohen-generic subset G of κ . The forcing conditions are mappings of cardinality smaller than κ from κ to
{0,1}. We deﬁne the model (F G ∪ κ,<κ, RG). Here F G is the set of all subsets of κ which agree with G everywhere except
in a set of cardinality smaller than κ , <κ is the natural order of κ and RG is a relation which tells which elements of κ
belong to which sets in F G . The model (F−G ∪ κ,<κ, R−G) is deﬁned in an analogous way for the complement −G of G .
We note that this forcing is < κ-closed so it does not add any new subsets of cardinals smaller than κ . If κ is inaccessible,
all cardinals below κ are preserved and κ remains inaccessible.
No forcing condition can determine the model (F G ∪ κ,<κ, RG) in any way, as a forcing condition deﬁnes the value of
G only in a subset of κ which has cardinality less than κ . For any forcing condition p there are two generic ﬁlters G and
G ′ containing p such that
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and
˙(F G ∪ κ,<κ, RG)V G
′
= ˙(F−G ∪ κ,<κ, R−G)V G .
Thus the models (F G ∪ κ,<κ, RG) and (F−G ∪ κ,<κ, R−G) are ZF-equivalent with parameters from the ground model.
As the forcing does not add any new subsets of any cardinals smaller than κ , by Lemma 2.8 the models are L2κ,ω-equivalent.
But they are not isomorphic: the well-ordered structure (κ,<κ) is rigid, so every subset of κ would be mapped in an
isomorphism to itself. However G ∈ (F G ∪ κ,<κ, RG) and G /∈ (F−G ∪ κ,<κ, R−G), so there is no isomorphism. 
Theorem 6.7. Let M be a transitive model of ZFC and let κ be a regular cardinal in M. If we force a Cohen subset of κ in M, in the
generic extension there are two ZF-equivalent non-isomorphic models of cardinality λ in all cardinalities λ κ .
Proof. We have proved that adding a Cohen subset of a regular cardinal κ produces two models of cardinality κ which are
non-isomorphic but satisfy the same formulas of the language of set theory with parameters from the ground model. In fact
Cohen subsets produce such models in all cardinalities λ  κ . This is because we can extend the universes of the models
deﬁned in Theorem 6.6 by adding λ new elements, which do not belong to any of the relations of the model. These new
models can be constructed from the models introduced in Theorem 6.6 and the term λ, and thus they are ZF-equivalent. 
6.3. Independence
We have proved that it is independent of ZFC whether A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds at a regular cardinal κ . It happens that these
are also relatively independent of each other, as the following theorem demonstrates.
Theorem 6.8. Let J be a ﬁnite set of regular cardinals. It is consistent that A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails for all cardinals κ in J and holds at every
regular cardinal κ not in J .
Proof. We start from L and use iterated forcing to add Cohen subsets of all cardinals in J , adding a Cohen subset ﬁrst to
the smallest cardinal in J and proceeding this way upwards. We note that GCH holds in L and adding a single Cohen subset
preserves GCH so GCH is preserved all the way through our forcing. Also cardinals are preserved. Let κ be a cardinal in J . It
follows from the Factor Lemma that the iterated forcing can be decomposed into P<κ ∗ Pκ ∗ P>κ as follows. The forcing P<κ
preserves GCH and cardinals and Pκ adds a Cohen subset of κ . Thus after P<κ ∗ Pκ we have GCH, cardinals are preserved
and A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails because of the proof of Theorem 6.6 applied after P<κ . The forcing P>κ is κ
+ closed and thus does not
add any subsets of cardinals smaller than or equal to κ . Consequently, P>κ does not change the truth value of A(L2κ,ω, κ),
which is false after the forcing P<κ ∗ Pκ .
Let now κ /∈ J . Our forcing can be decomposed into P<κ ∗ P>κ . The forcing P<κ adds some Cohen subsets below κ
and P>κ adds only subsets of cardinals greater than κ . Thus after the forcing H(κ+) ⊆ L[X] for some X ⊆ λ < κ and from
Theorem 6.3 it follows that A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds. 
Theorem 6.9. Let J be a set which contains some successor cardinals and possibly ω. It is consistent that A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails for all κ ∈ J ,
and holds for all successor cardinals outside J and for all inaccessible cardinals which do not have a coﬁnal subset in J .
Proof. Let L be the ground model. We use a backward Easton forcing [16] with full support in all limit stages, which proceeds
upwards and adds Cohen subsets of all cardinals in J .
The forcing conditions are as follows:
1. If ω ∈ J , then P0 is the set of ﬁnite partial functions from ω to {0,1}. A forcing condition p is stronger than forcing
condition q if and only if p extends q. If ω /∈ J , then P0 is the trivial forcing.
2. Assume α = β+ and Pγ has been deﬁned for all γ  β .
If ℵα ∈ J , we deﬁne Pα to be the set of sequences pγ ,γ  α where the γ th coordinate belongs to Pγ for each
γ < α, and the αth coordinate is a forcing name X˙ such that p  α  “ X˙ is a partial function from ℵα to {0,1} and
| X˙| < ℵα”. If p and q are two conditions of length α, then p is stronger than q if and only if p  α is stronger than
q  α and p  α  “p(α) and q(α) are partial functions from ℵα to {0,1} which have cardinality smaller than ℵα and
p(α) ⊇ q(α)”.
If ℵα /∈ J then Pα is the trivial forcing.
3. If α is a limit ordinal, forcing conditions in Pα are tuples p of length α such that for each β < α, p  β  “p(β) ∈ Pβ ”.
This forcing has full support in all limit stages, which means that in limit stages all coordinates of a forcing condition
may be non-zero. A forcing condition p is stronger than a forcing condition q if and only if p  β is stronger than q  β
for each β < α.
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1. κ remains a cardinal.
2. If κ is ω or a successor cardinal, A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails iff κ ∈ J . If κ is inaccessible cardinal and there is no coﬁnal subset
of κ in J then A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds.
3. The Generalized Continuum Hypothesis holds up to cardinal κ .
Let us assume the claim holds for all cardinals below κ . The forcing can be decomposed into:
P<κ ∗ Pκ ∗ P>κ
in such a way that after the forcing P<κ the Induction Hypothesis holds below κ and if κ ∈ J , then Pκ adds a Cohen subset
of κ , and if κ /∈ J , then Pκ is the trivial forcing. The forcing P>κ is κ+-closed, so it does not make any chance to Induction
Hypothesis in cardinals less or equal to κ .
If κ ∈ J , then the Cohen forcing makes A(L2κ,ω, κ) false, and adding a single Cohen subset does not make GCH false at κ .
If κ /∈ J , the trivial forcing does not make GCH false at κ . Also H(κ+) ⊆ L(X) for X ⊆ λ < κ which codes all the previously
added generic subsets, so from Theorem 6.3 it follows that A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds.
We still need to show that GCH is preserved at limit cardinals:
1. Assume λ is a singular limit cardinal. From the Induction Hypothesis we know that GCH holds below λ. Because our
ground model was L and the failure of the SCH(λ) implies 0 exists, after our forcing it cannot be that ¬SCH(λ). Thus
SCH(λ). Now λ is a strong limit cardinal so 2λ = λcf (λ) = λ+ by SCH(λ).
2. Let κ be an inaccessible cardinal. All subsets of κ in V G are constructible from a single set of cardinality κ which codes
all the generic sets added below κ . Thus the power set of κ has cardinality κ+ . 
Remark 6.10. If we allow J to be a proper class in the assumption of Theorem 6.9, the theorem seems still to be valid. Then
we just need to use a proper class of forcing conditions and the length of the iteration is a proper class.
Ajtai’s original proof (see Theorem 3.10) did not only show the independence of A(L2,ω), but it showed the indepen-
dence of whether nth order equivalence implies isomorphism for countable models for arbitrary n 2. This is also true for
the generalization of Ajtai’s result to arbitrary regular cardinals, Theorem 6.6, which we presented earlier in this section.
When we use iterated forcing and add Cohen subsets ﬁrst to smaller cardinals and then to bigger cardinals, adding Cohen
subsets to bigger cardinals does not change (inﬁnitary) second order equivalence of models at smaller cardinals. However, it
might change (inﬁnitary) higher order equivalence of models for some stronger higher order logics. The following question
is an example of the problem:
Open Question 6.11. Let P be the two-step iterated forcing which adds ﬁrst a Cohen subset of ℵ0 and then a Cohen subset of ℵ1 . Let
MG0 and M
−G
0 be the usual models constructed from the Cohen real and its complement produced in the ﬁrst step of P . Are the models
MG0 and M
−G
0 third order equivalent after the forcing P?
6.4. Singular cardinals
We have already given a generalization of Ajtai’s result to regular cardinals. Next we will turn our attention to the case
of singular cardinals. For the case of regular cardinals the languages L2κ,ω had an important role. For the singular cardinals
κ we introduce a language which has the same role as the languages L2κ,ω had for regular cardinals κ .
Deﬁnition 6.12. Let κ be a singular cardinal. We deﬁne L2κ =
⋃
λ<κ L
2
λ+,ω .
Note that the set of L2κ -formulas is closed under ﬁnitary ﬁrst order connectives and quantiﬁers, but not under conjunc-
tions or disjunctions of length cf (κ).
Two important facts about the languages L2κ are the following:
1. Every ordinal α < κ is characterizable in L2κ .
2. Every formula of L2κ can be expressed as a formula of the language of set theory using a subset of some λ < κ as a
parameter.
As the formulas of L2κ are the formulas of L
2
λ,ω for regular cardinals λ < κ , the above facts follow from Lemma 2.8 and
Lemma 2.7.
Theorem 6.13. If V = L then A(L2κ , κ) holds for any singular cardinal κ .
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any regular cardinal κ . Because all ordinals less than κ are characterizable in L2κ , the proof we used there works without
any changes for L2κ . 
Theorem 6.14. Let κ = ℵα be a singular cardinal. There is a forcing extension of L in which A(L2κ , κ) fails and all cardinals are
preserved.
Proof. Let L be the ground model. As in Theorem 6.9, we use the full support iterated Cohen forcing. This time we add
generic subsets of all regular cardinals smaller than κ .
Recall that for each regular ℵβ < κ our forcing creates two models MGβ and M−Gβ of cardinality ℵβ which are L2ℵβ ,ω-
equivalent and non-isomorphic. We deﬁne the models MGκ and M
−G
κ as follows:
MGκ contains the α-sequences which satisfy the following conditions:
1. If β < α and ℵβ is regular, the βth coordinate is either MGβ or M−Gβ .
2. If β < α and ℵβ is singular, the βth coordinate is ∅.
3. The set of indexes β where the βth coordinate is M−Gβ is not coﬁnal in α.
Similarly we deﬁne M−Gκ to contain those α-sequences which satisfy the following conditions:
1. If β < α and ℵβ is regular, the βth coordinate is either MGβ or M−Gβ .
2. If β < α and ℵβ is singular, the βth coordinate is ∅.
3. The set of indexes β where the βth coordinate is MGβ is not coﬁnal in α.
Clearly the models are non-isomorphic as there is no sequence in M−Gκ which could be mapped to the sequence in MGκ
which contains only the models MGβ .
We will now prove that the models are L2κ -equivalent. Assume not. Then there is a forcing condition p such that p 
“φ˙ ∈ L2κ ∧ φ˙(M˙Gκ ) ∧ ¬φ˙(M˙−Gκ )” for some forcing name φ˙. Thus, for any generic ﬁlter G such that p ∈ G we have V G |
φ(MG) ∧ ¬φ(M−G). The sentence φ is a sentence in the language of set theory with a subset of some ℵγ+ < κ as a
parameter.
We will now construct another generic ﬁlter G ′ which contains p such that φ˙V G = φ˙V G′ . The elements of G ′ are made
from elements of G by the following modiﬁcation:
1. Up to stage γ+ (where the formula φ appears) no modiﬁcation is done.
2. In the domain of p no modiﬁcation is done.
3. Above stage γ+ outside the domain of p the forcing condition is chanced to its mirror image, i.e., the domain remains
the same but zeros and ones chance places.
Clearly p ∈ G ′ . Also up to stage γ+ the generic sets G ′ and G agree about everything, so φ˙V G = φ˙V G′ . After stage γ+ the
generic set G ′ adds essentially complements of those sets which G adds to all regular cardinals. There is a difference only
in the domain of p which is always of a smaller cardinality. In particular MGβ = M−G
′
β and M
−G
β = MG
′
β for all γ
+ < β < α.
Also V G = V G ′ . Now M˙GV G
′
= M−G and M˙−GV G
′
= MG , i.e., the models chance places in the generic extensions. However,
the formula φ is the same and V G = V G ′ so φ cannot be true in one model and false in the other. 
We will next present a model of ZFC in which the inﬁnitary second order languages cannot characterize all models in
any cardinality.
Corollary 6.15. Assuming the consistency of an inaccessible cardinal, there is a model of ZFC in which A(L2κ , κ) fails for all singular
cardinals κ and A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails for all regular cardinals κ .
Proof. We start from a model of ZFC which satisﬁes V = L and there is an inaccessible cardinal. Let λ be the least inacces-
sible cardinal in that model. We proceed upwards and add by iterated Cohen forcing generic subsets of all regular cardinals
smaller than λ. At limit stages we take full support. After the forcing A(L2κ , κ) fails for all singular cardinals κ < λ and
A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails for all regular cardinals κ < λ and λ remains inaccessible. Thus V
(V G )
κ satisﬁes ZFC and A(L2κ , κ) fails for all
singular cardinals κ and A(L2κ,ω, κ) fails for all regular cardinals κ . 
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2
λ,ω,λ) does not fail
in coﬁnally many regular cardinals λ below κ?
7. A(L2,ω) and large cardinal axioms
7.1. Large cardinals
In this section we will discuss how some large cardinal axioms are related to A(L2,ω). First we will discuss consistency
of some large cardinal axioms with second order deﬁnable well-orders of the reals. Then we will show that if there are
enough large cardinals then A(L2,ω) is false. In the end we will discuss third order deﬁnable well-orders of the reals and
forcing axioms.
From the proof of Theorem 3.1 and some well-known facts about the consistency of well-orders of the reals with large
cardinals we get the following results:
Theorem 7.1. (See Ajtai [2], Silver [19], Martin and Steel [14].) It is consistent that there is a measurable cardinal and A(Σ14 ,ω) holds.
It is consistent that there are n Woodin cardinals and A(Σ1n+3,ω) holds. The above results are relative to the consistency of the relevant
large cardinal axioms.
Proof. The existence of a measurable cardinal with a Δ13 well-order of the reals is consistent [19], so by Theorem 3.1 it is
consistent that there is a measurable cardinal and A(Σ14 ,ω) holds. Also for each natural number n it is consistent to have
n Woodin cardinals and a Σ1n+2 well-order of the reals [14]. From Theorem 3.1 it follows that it is consistent that there are
n Woodin cardinals and A(Σ1n+3,ω) holds. 
We will next present a lemma which is needed to prove Theorem 7.4: “If there are enough large cardinals then A(L2,ω)
fails.”
Lemma 7.2. A(L2,ω) is true in V if and only if it is true in L(R).
Sketch. Countable models and isomorphisms between them are reals, and V and L(R) have the same reals. A truth
predicate of L2 for a countable model can be deﬁned inductively and is determined by the reals, so V and L(R) have the
same second order truth predicates of countable models. Consequently a counterexample for A(L2,ω) in V or L(R) works
also in the other.
Theorem 7.3. (See Woodin [22].) If δ is a limit of Woodin cardinals and there exists a measurable cardinal above δ, then no forcing
construction in V δ can change the theory of L(R).
Corollary 7.4. If there is a measurable cardinal above a limit of Woodin cardinals then A(L2,ω) fails.
Proof. Assume there is a measurable cardinal above a limit of Woodin cardinals. We add a Cohen-generic real G to V as in
Theorem 3.10. Now A(L2,ω) is false in V [G]. By Lemma 7.2 A(L2,ω) is false in L(R)V [G] . By assumption and Theorem 7.3
A(L2,ω) is false in L(R)V and by Lemma 7.2 A(L2,ω) is false in V . 
Some large cardinal axioms imply that there is no second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals. In particular this holds
for large cardinal axioms that imply Projective Determinacy. These axioms possibly imply that A(L2,ω) fails. If that is the
case, we can ask the question: does A(L3,ω) hold? By the following theorem most large cardinal axioms are consistent
with A(L3,ω) (relative to the consistency of the large cardinal axiom in question).
Theorem 7.5. A(L3,ω) is consistent with practically all known consistent large cardinal axioms.
Proof. Let the ground model be a model of ZFC which satisﬁes your favorite large cardinal axiom. By a result of Abraham
and Shelah [1] it is possible to force a third order deﬁnable well-order of the reals with a small forcing12. In the generic
extension A(L3,ω) holds because of the same reasoning as in Theorem 3.1. If the large cardinal axiom was preserved in the
forcing, then the generic extension satisﬁes the large cardinal axiom and A(L3,ω). 
12 If κ is a large cardinal we say that a notion of forcing P is small (relative to κ ) if |P | < κ . Practically all large cardinals are preserved in small forcings
[9] (Theorem 21.2).
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As we already noted in section 3, it is an open question whether Martin’s Axiom is consistent with A(L2,ω). Unlike the
consistency of the Proper Forcing Axiom and Martin’s Maximum, the consistency of Martin’s Axiom +2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 = ℵ2 can
be proved from the consistency of ZFC.
In all our examples of models of ZFC where A(L2,ω) holds, there is a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals. It
is well known that Projective Determinacy implies that there is no second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals.
Theorem 7.6. (See Steel [20].) The Proper Forcing Axiom implies that there is no second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals.
Since the Proper Forcing Axiom implies Projective Determinacy [20], if A(L2,ω) is consistent with the Proper Forcing
Axiom, then A(L2,ω) can hold without a second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals.
Open Question 7.7. Is Proper Forcing Axiom consistent with A(L2,ω)?
Theorem 7.8. Assuming the consistency of the relevant large cardinal axioms it is consistent that Martin’s Maximum holds with
A(L3,ω).
Proof. By Paul Larson’s result [11] Martin’s Maximum is consistent with the existence of a well-order of the reals deﬁnable
in H(ℵ2) without parameters.
By Lemma 2.5 we can quantify over elements of H(ℵ2) in third order logic thus Martin’s Maximum is consistent with
a third order deﬁnable well-order of the reals. Consequently it is consistent that Martin’s Maximum holds and A(L3,ω)
holds. 
8. Summary and future work
8.1. Summary
If κ is an inﬁnite cardinal we can ask the question what is the least logic L such that every L-theory is κ categorical.
If κ is a regular cardinal, adding a Cohen subset of κ makes sure that no such small deﬁnable logic L exists. If κ is a
singular cardinal, adding Cohen subsets of coﬁnally many λ < κ by an iterated forcing, taking full support at all limits,
does essentially the same. However, there is always a small logic L with generalized quantiﬁers such that all L-theories are
κ-categorical but L may be not deﬁnable in the language of set theory.
In the countable cardinality the “small" logic can be second order logic. If V = L even Σ13 is enough. With n Woodin
cardinals Σ1n+3 can be enough. But if there are inﬁnitely many Woodin cardinals and a measurable cardinal above them
then A(L2,ω) fails. However A(L3,ω) is consistent with practically all large cardinal axioms. A(L3,ω) is also consistent
with Martin’s Maximum.
In an uncountable regular cardinality the small logic can be L2κ,ω or L
n where n  4. Whether A(L2κ,ω, κ) holds for
different cardinals κ is very much independent of each other.
The following table contains information about whether A(L, κ) holds for certain language L and cardinal κ . In the
intersection of an L-row and a κ-column we have described in the left-hand-side a model of ZFC where A(L, κ) holds
and on the right-hand-side a model of ZFC where A(L, κ) fails (if they exist). The question mark means an open question.
Cohen, iter., and P X,κ refer to suitable Cohen forcing, iterated Cohen forcing with full support in all limit stages and the
forcing P X,κ deﬁned in Section 4, respectively. Regular column refers to arbitrary uncountable regular cardinals and singular
column refers to arbitrary uncountable singular cardinals. The ground model is L in all the forcings:
A(L, κ) ℵ0 regular singular
F O −/always −/always −/always
Lκ+,ω always/− κ = ℵ0/κ = ℵ0 −/always
L2 V = L/Cohen ?/V = L ?/V = L
L2κ,ω/L
2
κ V = L/Cohen V = L/Cohen V = L/iter.
L3 V = L/Cohen ?/V = L ?/V = L
L4 V = L/Cohen P X,κ /V = L P X,κ /V = L
Ln V = L/Cohen P X,κ /V = L P X,κ /V = L
Z F V = L/Cohen P X,κ /V = L P X,κ /V = L
8.2. Future work
In this subsection we list the most important open questions and possible directions of future research.
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Open Question 8.1. Is it consistent with ZFC that A(L2,ω) holds, but there is no second order deﬁnable well-order of the reals?
Shelah and Väänänen are preparing a paper with a positive answer to this question.
Adding a Cohen subset of a regular cardinal produces two ZF-equivalent non-isomorphic models of cardinality κ . When
we do iterated Cohen forcings we have not been able to prove that the models remain ZF-equivalent. The following question
is an example of that: Let L be the ground model and P = P0 ∗ P1 be an iterated forcing which adds ﬁrst a Cohen subset of
ω and then a Cohen subset of ℵ1. Let G be a P -generic set over L and G0 the P0-generic set over L determined by G and
MG0 and M−G0 the models constructed from G0 and −G0 (see Theorem 3.10). Are MG0 and M−G0 third order equivalent
in L[G]?
Open Question 8.2. Is it consistent with ZFC that A(L2, κ) holds for an uncountable cardinal κ? If not, is it consistent that A(L3, κ)
holds for an uncountable cardinal κ?
Open Question 8.3. Is it consistent with ZFC that Martin’s axiom + 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 holds with A(L2,ω).
Possible directions for future research:
1. Our results are often related to models which resemble L a lot (Theorem 6.3 is used in many results). An interesting
question is whether our results could be generalized to inner models of some large cardinals.
2. The question about whether every L-theory is κ-categorical in a model class C . We have here only discussed brieﬂy the
Fraïssé Hypothesis, i.e., the above question in case L = L2, κ =ω and C is the class of ordinals.
3. Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski models. Adding a Cohen real introduces two countable non-isomorphic ZF-equivalent linear
orders [10]. Suitable cardinal collapse makes the Fraïssé Hypothesis fail [13]. For which theories T can we construct
non-isomorphic ZF-equivalent Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski models over these linear orders (or ordinals)? Is this possible for
all unstable theories? Tapani Hyttinen, Kaisa Kangas and Jouko Väänänen have worked on this question [8].
4. Bigger vocabularies. We have considered only ﬁnite vocabularies here. One could ask questions of the form “What is
the least logic L such that every model of cardinality κ with vocabulary of cardinality λ can be characterized by its
L-theory?”.
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